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DEREK N. PEWt
The era of the leveraged buyout (LBO) has passed, replaced by
the age of the Chapter 11 filing.' In the 1980s, American compa-
nies engaged in a profligate exchange of debt for equity, spurred by
the accessibility of capital for the acquisition and defense of
corporate assets.2  Eventually, however, huge debt servicing
burdens, coupled with recent marketwide downturns and a
concurrent dearth of refinancing capital,3 proved too much for
these companies to bear. Facing decreasing revenues, reduction of
cash flow, and, consequently, frequent defaults on debt obliga-
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rNotable LBOs, or highly leveraged transactions (HLTs), of publicly traded
companies that have filed for Chapter 11 protection since 1988 include: Allied Stores
Co., Inc., Best Products Corp., Federated Department Stores, Hillsborough Holdings,
National Gypsum Co., Resorts International, Revco D.S., Inc., and Southland Corp.
See THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 81 (Christopher McHugh ed., 1991).
These eight companies represented over $24 billion in assets that were under Chapter
11 protection in 1991. Federated has since emerged from bankruptcy. See Laura
Zinn & Michele Galen, Short Chapter, Happy Ending, BUS. WK., Feb. 10, 1992, at 126
(discussing the conglomerate's emergence from bankruptcy in February 1992). The
newest member to join the group of LBOs which have gone bust is R.H. Macy & Co.
with nearly $5 billion in assets currently under Chapter 11 protection. See Barbara
Grady, Macy files for Chapter 11 After Dismal Christmas, REUTER BUS. REP., Jan. 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT File.
2 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 529 tbl. 868 (1991) (indicating a growth in corporate
liabilities from $7,617 billion in 1980 to $15,311 billion in 1987); see also
Edmund Faltermeyer et al., The Deal Decade: Verdict on the '80s, FORTUNE, Aug. 26,
1991, at 58 (discussing a study of 1980s LBOs by Steve Kaplan and Jeremy Stein
indicating that the average ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and
depreciation to debt fell from 1.2 in early 1980s deals 0.7 in deals from 1986
to 1988).
3 The dearth of refinancing capital preceded the recession; there was a
noticeable reduction in available capital after the United Airlines takeover
which collapsed in the fall of 1989 when Citibank balked on its proposed
funding. See Sharon Harvey, Banks Reevaluate in Wake of UAL Fiasco, INSTITUTION-
AL INVESTOR'S BANK LETTER, Oct. 23, 1989, at 1.
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tions,4 these companies have been turning, in increasing numbers,
to Chapter 11 protection from their creditors. The combination of
the flood of general business Chapter 11 filings5 and LBO failures
has resulted in a dramatic alteration of the landscape of modern
bankruptcy in the United States. Significantly, this increase in
filings tests the ability of the Bankruptcy Code to respond to the
financial and legal needs of these companies and their creditors.
Neither the general economic environment at the time of the
principal redrafting of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, nor that at the
time of the 1984 amendments, bears much resemblance to the
current bankruptcy environment. 6 Indeed, the current swell of
corporate assets under Chapter 11 protection must have been
unforeseeable to Code drafters for whom there was no hint of such
an overwhelming future financial collapse. 7 And although much of
the Code has demonstrated flexibility, and, to a certain extent, has
been reformed by amendment where it has fallen short, the rapid
changes in legal and financial approaches to the current Chapter 11
problem have demonstrated shortcomings, particularly in the area
of large corporate and LBO failures.
8
4 See, e.g., Kathie O'Donnell, Hard Times Will Make 1991 Default Rate the Highest
in 20 Years, Moody's Says, BOND BUYER, Dec. 20, 1991, at 3 (stating that the
default rate on corporate bonds was expected to hit a twenty-year high in
1991).
5 See DUN & BRADSTREET, BUS. FAILURE REC. 8 (1990) (indicating that at least
20,000 business Chapter 11 filings occurred in 1990, fewer than the nearly
25,000 filings in 1986, but substantially more than the roughly 6,000 filings
in 1980).
6 See Barbara A. Rehm, A Projected Cost of Easy Credit: I Million Bankruptcies This
Year, AM. BANKER, Sept. 5, 1991, at 1 (citing a prediction made by the American
Bankruptcy Institute that one million bankruptcy filings will be recorded
in fiscal year 1991-92, a nearly threefold increase over the 360,329 filings
recorded in the fiscal year beginning June 1980, and indicating that nearly
six million bankruptcies have been filed since 1979). Although roughly the
same number of business Chapter 11 filings occurred in both 1984 and 1990,
see Dun & Bradstreet, supra note 5, at 8, the total assets in Chapter 11
bankruptcy have increased from $6.5 billion to $82.7 billion over the same
period of time, a dramatic increase. Even assuming inflation of 5% annually
during the period, the net present value of $82.7 billion in 1984 dollars
would have been $61.7 billion, a nearly nine and one half-fold increase. See
THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 30.
7 See John F. Hilson & Pamela A. Kohlman, The Financing of Chapter 11 Debtors:
Some Lenders Are Seeking Them Out, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 23 (stating a
conclusion not borne out by future events, that "the rate of business
failures appears to have peaked").
8 Indeed, there has been a call by some bankruptcy lawyers to get rid of
Chapter 11 altogether. See Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers
Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process, WALL ST.J., Mar. 19, 1992, at B5.
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Most prominent among these shortcomings has been the confu-
sion in the Code regarding the means available for accelerating the
bankruptcy process. Speed in bankruptcy is important in several
ways that are accentuated by the recent increase in business failures.
For courts overburdened by bankruptcy filings, 9 speedier recoveries
and quicker processes mean alleviation of crowded dockets. For
certain debtors,10 a speedy emergence from bankruptcy means
swifter restructuring of debt and faster return to competition in the
market, as well as a reduction in legal fees." Finally, for creditors,
speed means, all other things being equal, lower legal costs and
quicker collection on loans that are in default.
12
The desire for speed has focused lawyers' attention on develop-
ing new methods for handling clients' bankruptcy needs. At the
forefront of these methods has been the use of prepackaged
bankruptcies 3 and hybrids of them.14  Concurrently, the desire
9 Pending bankruptcy actions in U.S. courts have increased from roughly
660,000 in 1985 to nearly 930,000 in 1989. See THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND
ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 21.
10 It could be argued that even in the face of the added costs some
debtors may benefit from lengthy bankruptcy proceedings; if the cause of
their bankruptcy was not excessive debt, but rather some combination of
poor management and unsound business practices, such problems might be
examined and corrected by creditors and courts. Alternatively, debtors
who have high debt burdens but a sound underlying business benefit from
accelerated proceedings. This latter group generally includes mature LBOs.
"tTypically, Chapter 11 proceedings consume nearly two-and-one-half
years, often damaging relations with customers and suppliers, devastating
employee morale, and running up millions in legal and financial fees. See 31-
day Bankruptcy Highlights Classic "Pre-packaged" Plan, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 28, 1992.
12An argument can also be made that speed reduces the ability of
creditors to assess the situation and to make important judgments that
might affect their ultimate return on their outstanding debt. Nevertheless,
there is a gain in receiving payment sooner rather than later because of the
time value of money (all else being equal).
" A prepackaged bankruptcy generally allows debtors to present a plan
of reorganization to a statutorily defined group of creditors prepetition,
and permits acceptance of the plan by those creditors prior to filing. The
result is a faster bankruptcy process. For a more detailed description, see
Stephen H. Case & Mitchell A. Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged
Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act for Instant Reorganizations, (Apr. 12, 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file as part of a bankruptcy law symposium at New York
University School of Law).
14 See Dwight Cass, Street Weighs New Bankruptcy Technique, CORP. FINANCING
WK., Sept. 9, 1991, at 1 (reporting that "[i]nvestment bankers and lawyers are
closely eyeing a legal technique dubbed an 'instant bankruptcy' that would
allow a company to file for and emerge from Chapter 11 simultaneously");
Cauri Coyal, Hybrids Emerging as New Wrinkle on Prepackaged Bankruptcies,
1992] 2473
2474 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:2471
for speed has changed the financial sector's lending habits by
focusing banks' attention on the lending opportunities created by
the increasing use of these accelerated bankruptcy processes.
In particular, there has been an increased emphasis by money-
center banks on postpetition lending to large failing corpora-
tions.15 Section 364 of the Code16 sanctions certain loans that
help debtors operate postpetition 17 by providing needed working
capital. These loans help stimulate emergence from bankruptcy by
allowing more normal business operation in the period before
confirmation of a plan for reorganization.1 8 To attract creditors
who would otherwise be subject to substantial risk because of the
lack of assets available for security, 19 these postpetition loans are
frequently superpriority loans, in which courts offer priority over all
existing creditors to the new lender. For new creditors, the loans
offer comparatively short maturities and high up-front fees.
20
BONDWEEK, May 13, 1991, at 1 (reporting predictions that "[fjinancially
troubled companies that cannot file prepackaged bankruptcies will
increasingly turn to hybrid or partial prepacks as a way of speeding up and
cutting the costs of reorganizing under Chapter 11").
15 See Karen Padley, Chemical Bank Leads in Loans to Ailing Companies, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Sept. 13, 1991, at 1.
16 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
17 After filing for bankruptcy, the debtor may be permitted to continue
running the business as a debtor in possession (DIP). See id. § 1107 (generally
giving a DIP all the rights and powers of a trustee). In some cases a "trustee
in bankruptcy" (TIB) may be appointed to run the business. See id. § 926(a)
(stating that where a debtor fails in his duties and obligations under the
Code with respect to preferences, fraudulent transfers and conveyances, and
other areas, "on request of a creditor, the court may appoint a trustee to
pursue such cause of action").
1 The additional capital allows management to maintain the daily
operations of the business as if it were not in bankruptcy.
19 Most prepetition assets of the debtor are subject to security interests
that were granted to obtain prepetition credit. Accordingly, unless some
of those security interests are avoidable, the only property available for
securing fresh loans is that acquired by the DIP postpetition. See id. § 547(b)
(granting the trustee the power to avoid certain preferential transfers); id.
§ 548(a), (b) (granting the trustee the power to avoid certain fraudulent
transfers); id. § 544(a) (granting the trustee the power to avoid certain
security interests); id. § 545 (granting the trustee the power to avoid certain
statutory liens).
20 On average, DIP loans mature in two years with two to three basis
points in fees (2-3% of the total outstanding commitment) and rates at Prime
plus 1-1/2 or LIBOR plus 2-1/2 (roughly 1-1/2% above the interest rate
charged to the banks' best customers). These rates are very similar to those
charged by senior debt in LBO financings in the 1980s, but the loan is
substantially shorter than the five to seven year maturities of LBO senior
debt. Telephone Interview with Kenneth A. Lang, Vice President, Structured
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Consequently, many money-center banks that had excelled in
leveraged buyout financing have shifted their emphasis to debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing.
21
Although DIP financing plays a clear role in the Code as a
postpetition vehicle, it is unclear what role it has prepetition. In
practice, debtors may need to negotiate comprehensively for or
agree to DIP financing prepetition. 22 Although, generally, prepeti-
tion executory contracts are assumable by the DIP to the extent that
they bring value to the estate, 23 the Code does not allow such
assumption of financial accommodation contracts. 24  Section
365(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibits the assump-
tion or assignment of prepetition contracts made "to make a loan,
or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or
for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor
"25
In a prepetition agreement for DIP lending, however, both the
creditor and the debtor are clearly aware of the impending
bankruptcy. Indeed, the bankruptcy filing is a necessary precondi-
tion to the execution of the DIP financing agreement. It is illogical,
therefore, to require renegotiation of the financing agreement after
the filing. Moreover, this renegotiation requirement undermines
Finance, BT Securities Corp. (Feb. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Lang Interview].
21 See Padley, supra note 15, at 1.
2 Some debtors may want to compare the opportunities offered by
bankruptcy with those offered in an out-of-bankruptcy workout. Other
debtors may want to approach creditors with a prepackaged plan and need
some idea of what DIP financing will look like. Finally, some debtors may
simply desire to put in place some of the important features of their
bankruptcy plan so that, upon filing, substantial negotiation of the DIP
loan will already have occurred. Lang Interview, supra note 20; see, e.g., CoWs
Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection: The 156-year-old Gun Manufacturer Is Beset
by Weak Sales, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1992, at D2 (stating that Colt's agreed to
its DIP financing the night before it filed for bankruptcy); Charles Storch,
Farley Inc. Still in Long, Often Tense Talks to Restructure Debt, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1991,
at C4 (stating that Farley Inc. was in negotiation "with Bank of New York
for debtor-in-possession financing" prior to filing under Chapter 11).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1988) ("The trustee, subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor.").
24 The point at which prepetition discussions become enforceable
contracts is a matter of state law and will vary depending on which
jurisdiction's laws govern a particular agreement.
2 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2)(1988). As will be explored later, the reasons for
the drafting of this section were to prevent prepetition creditors from being
forced to extend further credit after bankruptcy was filed. See infra notes
62-63 and accompanying text.
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the effort to speed the bankruptcy process through prepetition
planning. The novelty of these prepetition agreements, however,
means that challenges to the provisions of § 365(c)(2) have only
recently come before the courts. The struggle between a literal
reading of the Code, which clearly prohibits assumption of these
agreements, and a reinterpretation based on the realities of the
marketplace is apparent. Courts faced with prepetition financial
accommodation agreements made by the parties in anticipation of
bankruptcy have drawn conflicting conclusions.
26
In the most recent case on point, In re TS Industries, Inc.,27 the
court found that prepetition workout agreements extending
financial accommodations postpetition to a bankrupt are "not the
type of agreement[s] that [were] contemplated as being barred from
assumption under § 365(c)(2)." 28  This decision came down just
four days after the Ninth Circuit had determined that "[s]ection
365(c)(2) unambiguously prohibits the assumption of financial
accommodation contracts, regardless of the consent of the non-
debtor party."2 9 Although the TS Industries holding may well be
the desirable result in light of the current bankruptcy environment-
a point that is argued in this Comment-the logic of the court is
tenuous in the face of the plain language of the statute prohibiting
the assumption of financial accommodation clauses.
This ambiguity provides impetus for amending or redrafting
§ 365(c)(2). Uncertainty as to whether or not the Code will be read
literally creates risk-shifting problems for the creditor and debtor.
Instead of one interpretation which clearly leaves the risk with one
party, allowing that party to contract accordingly, the uncertainty of
26 Compare In re TS Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990)
(concluding that a prepetition workout entered into by the parties in
anticipation of bankruptcy, which expressly anticipates incorporation of the
terms into the reorganization plan, is not the type of agreement that § 365
(c)(2) intends to bar from assumption) and In re Prime, Inc., 15 B.R. 216, 217-18
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding that financial accommodation agreements
are assumable as long as the creditor consents, and that the statute should
be read in the context of the statutory powers given the trustee to operate
the business) with In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 116 B.R. 712, 718 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that § 365(c)(2) unambiguously prohibits the assumption
of financial accommodation contracts) and In re New Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326,
328 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1982) (finding that the intent of Congress is in the plain
language of the statute and that financial accommodation agreements are
not enforceable postpetition by the DIP).
27 117 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
28 Id. at 687.
29 In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 116 B.R. at 718.
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how the Code will be read pressures both the parties into entering
contracts in which each must assume that the risk burden will fall
on her. The uncertainty thereby creates systemic loss, because both
parties must expend resources to protect against a single risk.
The risk to the debtor is particularly grave ° because of the
irreversible change of circumstance that filing for bankruptcy brings
to the debtor's business. A debtor relying on its ability to assume
the prepetition contract for DIP financing-either because it assumes
that the statute will be interpreted to allow assumption (TS
Industries), or because it believes that even if the statute is read to
disallow assumption (literal reading), the market will force the
creditor to make good on its promise to finance51-may find itself
filing for bankruptcy only to find that its creditor is unwilling to
So Clearly there is also risk for the creditor, though it is not as obvious
as the risk to the debtor. For example, if the creditor simply relies on the
plain language of the Code, disallowing assumability, the creditor will be
less concerned with its prepetition negotiations as it presumes its ability to
renegotiate postpetition. The creditor has incentives to reduce its costs
prepetition if possible since competition for DIP financing necessarily reduces
the perceived value to the creditor of winning the financing agreement. To
illustrate, if there are four creditors vying for the DIP agreement and the
anticipated fee is $4 million, each creditor will only anticipate receiving a
$1 million dollar fee. Depending on the internal demands for specific
returns on the transaction, each bank will only want to spend some amount
less than the $1 million expected return in performing its due diligence and
negotiation work. Reliance on the strict language of the Code, therefore,
should induce the creditors to undertake what may amount to less than the
necessary investigation that is required to perform the loan. Meanwhile, if
the Code is read to allow assumption, the creditor may be forced to comply
with an agreement which it did not anticipate to be binding. Accordingly,
as competition intensifies and creditors take more risks in making DIP
financings, the safety net created by the language of the Code becomes even
more meaningful to creditors as they weigh the value of their prepetition
expenditures.
31 In the current bankruptcy environment, money-center banks have
overwhelming incentives to stand behind their prepetition agreements for
DIP financing because: (1) heightened competition among lenders to attract
those demanding DIP loans necessitates a projection to the market of
trustworthiness that would be shattered by walking out on a deal; (2) the
sunken costs of labor hours and the need to get fees creates great incentive
to follow the deal to conclusion; and (3) the floating nature of financing
terms (i.e., Prime plus 1-1/2%) means that fluctuations in interest rates will
not generally make a deal turn sour. Lang Interview, supra note 20.
Ultimately, however, it must be noted that the only reason for the
improbability of such creditors' actions are the market forces currently in
place. These forces act in spite of the Code, and any change in the market
forces, such as a change from a demand to a supply market for DIP lending,
would substantially increase the probability of such a scenario.
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extend financing, hiding behind the "nonassumability" language of
the statute. While such a change of heart by a creditor may be
unlikely in the current market,3 2 as DIP financing becomes more
prevalent and more competitive,33 it is logical that money-center
banks will take more risks to win financing agreements, particularly
if DIP financing proves to be highly lucrative. This added risk-
taking would presumably be in the form of pricing (either lower fees
and rates or different structures of rates, such as fixed rates) and
covenants (less restrictive or less inclusive), both of which are
valuable to the debtor, and both of which expose the creditors to
added lending risks.
Accordingly, as time goes by, competitive pressures should make
lending for DIP financing more dangerous, increasing the probabili-
ty of a creditor choosing to opt out of its prepetition agreement in
the event of unfavorable market changes. Paradoxically, as time
goes by, and the number of successful DIP financings increases,
debtors are likely to grow more confident in their ability to rely on
prepetition DIP financing agreements, regardless of the language or
interpretation of the statute. The potential catastrophe is obvious:
a large debtor will file for bankruptcy only to find that the financing
it was relying on to assist in its emergence from bankruptcy is no
longer available. Such a change in plans endangers the successful
reemergence of the company from bankruptcy, consequently
jeopardizing the well-being of that company's employees, suppliers
and customers, and the communities it serves.3 4 Clearly, the Code
should be changed to reflect the reliance that debtors place on the
assumability of prepetition agreements for DIP financing, and to
reduce the costs associated with unclear risk allocation due to
conflicting interpretations of the Code.
This Comment first explores the Bankruptcy Code provisions
regulating DIP financing and compares the transactions contemplat-
ed by statute with the practical operation of the current DIP
32 See supra note 31.
" See William Goodwin, Borrowers in Chapter 11 Look Enticing, AM. BANKER, May
4, 1990, at 1 (stating that "experts say [DIP financing] could rise dramatical-
ly").
s4 Arguably, this risk is particularly great assuming that larger, higher-
profile DIP financings should draw the toughest competition. This line of
reasoning would imply that a refusal by a creditor to stand behind its
prepetition agreement for DIP financing is more probable in the context of
very large DIP financings than in smaller financings, thus increasing the
value of the assets, the number of employees, and the effect on the market
of such a recision.
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financing market. Next, the Comment offers a generalized case
study of a distressed company and its interaction with lawyers and
lenders to demonstrate the forces that have brought DIP financing
agreements into prepetition. The Comment then turns to § 365,
which contains the general assumption and rejection rules of
executory contracts in bankruptcy, and analyzes its function within
the Bankruptcy Code. Through an analysis of case holdings, the
Comment will elucidate the problems faced by modern bankruptcy
courts in interpreting § 365(c)(2) in light of the current bankruptcy
environment. Finally, the Comment offers a simple proposal for
amending § 365(c)(2), arguing for the addition of consent language
that would clearly indicate that DIP financing agreements made
prepetition are assumable postpetition by the DIP.
I. DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND COMMON PRACTICE
Section 364 5 of the Bankruptcy Code is the statutory provision
governing DIP financing. The section is a graded approach for
attracting new financing postpetition. At the first level, the DIP,
without court approval, may obtain unsecured credit "in the
ordinary course of business" by granting an administrative priori-
tys6 to the lender.8 7 Since this type of credit applies only to
"ordinary course of business" transactions, it tends to be limited to
trade credit, which is rarely substantial enough to help the DIP
operate its business in bankruptcy. At the second level, the DIP can
grant an administrative priority to obtain unsecured credit not in the
ordinary course of business, but only with court approval.3 8 The
insubstantial protection of administrative priority, however, creates
little incentive for creditors to lend to DIPs, and such priority will
rarely attract sufficient funding to help the operation of the DIP's
business.8 9 More importantly, the section provides for the grant-
35 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
36 A creditor with an administrative priority will be the first unsecured
creditor to receive a distribution of assets of the estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(1) (1988).
37 See id. § 364(a) ("[T]he [DIP] may obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business allowable under section
503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense.").
8 Id. § 364(b) ("[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the
trustee to obtain unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than
under subsection (a) ... as an administrative expense.").
9 Although an administrative priority gives a creditor priority over
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ing of various levels of superpriority to prospective lenders that
would subordinate other secured creditors to the new DIP finan-
cier.40 These superpriority loans may have become more the norm
than the exception, 41 and although the debtor's original creditors
would seem to suffer by losing their priority, the larger senior debt
creditors rarely object.
42
The statute requires court authorization for this type of
superpriority postpetition financing.4 Read alone, this require-
ment seems to imply that negotiation with lenders should not begin
until after a bankruptcy petition has been filed.44 In order to
receive such financing, however, the DIP must move for a financing
order.45 Such a motion application requires that the proposed
DIP financing agreement be attached.4 6 Given the time necessary
to negotiate fully a DIP financing, and the pressing financial needs
of the DIP, Rule 4001(c)(1) would seem effectively to require the
debtor to initiate DIP financing negotiations prepetition. 47  In
practice, the debtor will approach its lenders, solicit loan commit-
ment letters, and will likely agree to the DIP facility with the most
other unsecured creditors, if there is no distribution to unsecureds, such
priority may be useless. See Joseph H. Levie, Financing the Debtor-in-Possession:
Superpriorities and Financing Orders, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1991, at 5 (stating that
"[t]here are few instances in which a lender has been willing to finance a
debtor-in-possession solely on the basis of an administrative priority").
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(1988) ("The court, after notice and a hearing,
may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a
senior or equal lien on property of the estate .... "); see also id. § 364(c)
(authorizing the granting of priority over other administrative expenses, the
granting of a lien on otherwise unencumbered property, or the granting of
a junior lien on property already subject to a lien).
41 See Goodwin, supra note 35, at 1.42 See Thomas G. Donlan, Super-security or Super-scarm? Financing for Bankrupt
Companies Goes Too Far, BARRON's, Feb. 3, 1992, at 10 (stating that 4[o]riginal
creditors usually don't fight DIP lending. Even though they may realize
they are being shafted, they are resigned to being shafted somehow in a
Chapter 11 reorganization"). But see Levie, supra note 39, at 6 (predicting that
"[i]f pre-existing secured lenders are to be primed ... without their consent,
an extended and contentious hearing may be expected").
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c), (d)(1988).
44 As discussed later, read with 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2), this would certainly
seem to be the result intended. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
45 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1) (1988).
46 See id. ("The motion shall be accompanied by a copy of the [financing]
agreement.").47 See Levie, supra note 39, at 6. Indeed, there may be a need to move beyond
negotiations to a formal agreement. A full agreement is not necessarily
rare. Lang Interview, supra note 20.
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attractive structure.4" Although, intuitively, it may not be clear
why companies would feel the need to agree to prepetition DIP
financing arrangements, an examination of the market forces at
work brings to light the pressures that drive these agreements.
Experiences with failing companies allow for some generaliza-
tions regarding the plight of the distressed prepetition debtor.
49
As cash flow falls short of the requirements of various debt
agreements, the distressed company will often either try to extend
the terms of, or default on, its trade credit and other debt.50 At
this point, the company is often approaching insolvency, meaning
that liabilities will soon exceed assets, leaving little or no value for
the equity holders. For managers and directors, who are typically
equity holders (especially in mature leveraged buyouts where a
limited number of equity holders took the company private),
51
there is a strong incentive to find ways to maximize investment by
weighing available means to enhance share value.52 In order to
evaluate the various options available, however, all aspects of out-of-
bankruptcy workout and in-bankruptcy reorganization must be
considered, as the risk of not doing so can be substantial, depend-
ing on the managers' investment.
To explore its options, the distressed company will typically
engage lawyers and investment bankers. One team of advisors will
48 Lang Interview, supra note 20.
49 Almost all of the information noted here was derived from a telephone
conversation with Mark C. Wheeler, Jr., Executive Vice President of Fleet
Bank of Massachusetts, on Feb. 10, 1992, who dealt with various prominent
distressed companies while working for a major money-center bank in New
York [hereinafter Wheeler Interview].
Whereas a specific example might have been more interesting, the need
for confidentiality regarding various situations prevents anything more
than a generalized account.
" For example, Macy's initial default on its trade debt left secured
creditors wondering whether they would be next. See Laura Zinn, A 'Death
Knell' at Macy's?, Bus. WK., Jan. 27, 1992, at 28; see also Paul Sweeting, Orion
Pictures Files for Chapter 11 Protection, BILLBoARD, Dec. 21, 1991, at 10 (discussing
Orion Pictures' default on interest and principal payments under its bank-
credit agreements).
51 See generally William Taylor, Crime? Greed? Big Ideas? What Were the '80s
about?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 32 (generally discussing the major
equity investors of the eighties).
52 See, e.g., Zinn, supra note 50, at 28 (indicating that Edward Finkelstein,
the C.E.O. of Macy's, invested $4.4 million in the initial LBO, while Laurence
Tisch invested nearly $15 million). These sums of money are indeed a strong
incentive when they are completely at risk if the company files for Chapter
11 protection.
1992] 2481
2482 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:2471
examine the possibilities of out-of-bankruptcy rehabilitation and
workout through negotiations with existing creditors. Another team
will explore bankruptcy reorganization through negotiations for DIP
financing, attempt to obtain commitment letters from prospective
DIP lenders, and analyze the relative value of bankruptcy reorgani-
zation to the company.
53
The engagement of advisors creates several added pressures on
the company. First, pressure will come from the advisors if they
perceive that bankruptcy is imminent; the desires of these advisors
to secure their fees prior to the bankruptcy filing can increase
pressure on the company successfully to negotiate and contract for
DIP financing prepetition.54 Thus, there is a tendency towards
having DIP financing contracts fully negotiated and agreed to,
subject to substantial caveats, prior to filing.55 Second, pressure
may come from creditors that are not included in the negotiations.
These creditors, fearing that they are being "cut out of the deal,"
may opt to force an involuntary bankruptcy on the company.
56
The threat of premature bankruptcy influences the company to
negotiate prepetition agreements more thoroughly and more
quickly, so that a financing plan is already in place in the event of
an involuntary filing. Third, pressure may come from the creditors
with whom negotiations are being held. If most of the debt is held
by a few large creditors, they may pressure the debtor into adopting
a prepackaged plan favorable to their interests,5 7 concurrently
pressuring the debtor to contract for DIP financing that is accept-
able to the creditors.
53 Telephone interview with Arthur M. Goldberg, Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer, Bally Manufacturing Corp. (Feb. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter Goldberg Interview].
5 See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 133 B.R. 13 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing the "lodestar" approach to attorney's fees in
Chapter 11 and questioning the reasonableness of financial advisory fees in
Chapter 11). Clearly, there is uncertainty as to what compensation will be
allowed by the bankruptcy court, and prepetition fees will be substantially
more attractive as they are not governed by the perceptions of the court.
For the DIP lender, however, who knows that postpetition fees are
guaranteed by winning the prepetition beauty contest, getting a completed
contract for DIP financing provides added assurance that fees will be
forthcoming.
55 Lang Interview, supra note 20.
M Goldberg Interview, supra note 53; see also 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)
(explaining the requirements of involuntary bankruptcy filing).
57 See, e.g., Zinn supra note 50, at 29 (stating that Macy's large lenders
"would be happier with a prepackaged bankruptcy filing-a quickie that
favors large debt-holders by bringing them into the restructuring process").
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The most important reason for the DIP's urgency in successfully
negotiating a financing agreement prepetition is that management
knows that the company will face significant capital needs as soon
as bankruptcy is filed. Indeed, depending on the nature of the
company's business, financing may be needed on the day of
filing.58 In order to have a DIP financing agreement in place at
the time of filing, the company must fully negotiate, if not agree to,
a DIP financing plan prepetition. Moreover, since the current
market forces leave little risk with the debtor in relying on these
agreements, there seems to be little reason not to contract for DIP
financing prepetition.59 Despite the above pressures and incen-
tives for companies to enter into contracts for DIP financing
prepetition, the Bankruptcy Code fails to recognize explicitly the
practical needs of debtors contemplating Chapter 11 protection.
The application of § 365, therefore, must be reexamined.
II. SECTION 365
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code deals with the assumption
or rejection by the DIP in bankruptcy of executory contracts. The
executory contract in bankruptcy is typically defined as "a contract
in which substantial performance obligations remain on both sides
of the agreement at the time that one party to the agreement files
bankruptcy."60 Because a prepetition agreement for DIP financing
would seem to satisfy this definition-substantial performance is
required by the debtor who must file for bankruptcy, and substantial
performance is required by the creditor who must lend after
bankruptcy is filed-the requirements of § 365 come to bear on
otherwise binding prepetition DIP financing agreements. Section
365 generally gives the DIP the discretion, under the auspices of the
bankruptcy court, to assume an executory contract if the DIP
8 This is particularly true for a retailer because the working capital
needs are high when the business relies on substantial inventory. Wheeler
Interview, supra note 49.
59 See supra note 31.
60 RaymondT. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: ProtectingtheFundamen-
tal Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 508 (1983); see also Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973) (defining an executory contract as "a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are
so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other").
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believes its performance would create a net gain to the estate. This
situation differs significantly from the scenario where only one of
the contractual parties has substantially performed its obligations.
If the nonbankrupt party is the substantial performer, it has a claim
against the estate, whereas if the bankrupt party is the substantial
performer the DIP can demand performance of the contract.
6 1
Significantly, the DIP's assumption of an executory contract
means that the obligation of the nonperforming party comes due
not in the normal course of business but in postpetition bankruptcy.
Prior to 1978, such a change of circumstance could be especially
damaging to lenders. Many loans, particularly revolving credits,
credit lines, letters of credit, and unexpired leases, could be
construed as executory contracts since such agreements contemplate
further lending by the creditor and borrowing by the debtor.
Accordingly, under the predecessor to the modern § 356 these
agreements could be assumed by the DIP (with approval by the
bankruptcy court), effectively forcing lending institutions to extend
further financing to a bankrupt. The absurdity of this result was
persuasively argued at the hearings concerning the 1978 redrafting
of the Code62 and § 365 was amended to provide an exception for
lenders to the general rule of assumability.
63
61 See Countryman, supra note 60, at 451-60. For an example of a half-
performed contract, see Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executoiy
Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1989):
[S]uppose the debtor-seller had delivered ... onions before bank-
ruptcy, leaving nothing but the estate's inherited right to payment
of $500 by the Other Party. Unless the cost of suit exceeded $500,
the trustee would simply enforce the right and get the money. By
the same token, if the Other Party buyer had paid the $500 before
bankruptcy but the onions had not been delivered ... the trustee
would have the simple choice of performing the obligation, picking
and delivering the onions, or paying damages for nonperfor-
mance... Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
Note that the claim of the Other Party will be treated as an unsecured
claim, and will be paid out of the distribution of the estate to the unsecured
creditors. See id. at 292.
62 Hearings of the Senate Committee on the Judiciay, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 576
(1977) (statement of Robert Grimmig, representative of the American Bankers'
Association) ("[W]e believe that this problem must be met by a clear
amendment of § 365 to preclude the preposterous situation of a lending
institution being required to make a loan to a bankrupt.").
One might also argue here that it is equally absurd to require a seller
to go forward on delivery of goods to a bankrupt (which is the result of
standard assumption of an executory contract under § 365(a)) because it is
like forcing the contracting party to extend credit as well.
63 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1988); see also id. § 365(a) ("Except as provided in
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The amended section, § 365(c)(2), 64 clearly defines the exclu-
sions which Congress chose to make:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if... such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend
other debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the
benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor .... 65
Thus, the current version of § 365 allows the DIP to assume in
postpetition all executory contracts unless they are specifically
excluded in the defined subsections of § 365. The risk of further
obligation after bankruptcy for these nonexcluded contracts is
borne by the non-bankrupt party to the contract. Contracts that are
specifically excluded from § 365 leave risk with the debtor because
in order for the DIP to realize a benefit from these contracts they
must be renegotiated post-bankruptcy. The plain language of the
§ 365(c)(2) exclusion therefore seems to indicate an intent to allow
postpetition renegotiation of executory contracts for financial
accommodations, thereby shifting risk away from prospective
lenders.
A. The Interaction of § 365(c)(2) with § 364
As previously mentioned, prepetition agreements for DIP
financing are best categorized as executory contracts falling under
the regulation of § 365 in that they satisfy the "substantial perfor-
mance obligations remain[ing] on both sides" definition of Country-
man and Nimmer.66  Courts have also agreed on this point.
6 7
Accordingly, the "nonassumability" exception of § 365(c)(2) bears
sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this
section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.").
r4 See S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844-45; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6304.
65 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1988).
66 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., In re TS Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 685 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990)
(interpreting §365 to apply to executory contracts that the debtor enters
prepetition); In re Prime, Inc., 15 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding
that the debt financing arrangement was an executory contract governed
by § 365); In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc., 116 B.R. 712, 717 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that generally § 365 governs the postpetition continuation of
prepetition contractual relations).
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directly on the prepetition DIP financial agreements in question in
that they "make a loan, or extend other debt financing" to the
bankrupt.68 Application of § 365 to these agreements, however,
essentially guts their usefulness to the DIP. The prepetition
negotiations with the lender notwithstanding, these contracts cannot
be assumed postpetition following the clear language of § 365(c)(2).
The overlap of § 364 and § 365 demonstrates either that Code
drafters intended to prohibit prepetition agreements for DIP
financing (a point which is difficult to reconcile with the apparent
reasons for adding § 365(c)(2) described above) or simply that Code
drafters did not anticipate that prepetition agreements for DIP
financing would occur. Regardless, the statutory framework would
seem to make these prepetition agreements binding only to the
extent that the lender is willing to reaffirm its obligation under the
contract after bankruptcy has been filed.
Thus, whereas § 364 is mute in proscribing when DIP agree-
ments should be made, because Rule 4001(c)(1) 69 requires a
financing agreement to be reached before the court will grant a
financing order, 70 and more importantly, because of the pressures
of market forces, 71 debtors are compelled to agree to these
financings prepetition. Section 365(c)(2), however, as literally
written, states that these contracts are not assumable by the debtor
postpetition.
This interpretation of the two sections is difficult to reconcile
with reality, considering that both the DIP financing lender and the
debtor understand that the loan will only occur if there is a
subsequent bankruptcy filing. Although it is appealing to assume
that the drafters simply could not have intended such a preposter-
ous reading of the statute, the literal reading of § 365(c)(2) is hard
to ignore.
B.Judicial Attempts to Redefine the Role of § 365(c)(2)
Finding § 365(c)(2) inapplicable to prepetition negotiations for
DIP financing would be one way of resolving these apparent
contradictions in the Code, and in fact, some courts have valiantly
tried to reinterpret this section of the Code in order to enforce
prepetition lending agreements. However, reliance on the courts is
68 11 U.S.C. § 365(c).
69 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1) (1991).
70 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 31.
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a less than optimal means of responding to the problem, as there is
little evidence that Congress intended anything beyond the plain
language of the statute.7 2 Indeed, the court decisions that have
made the reinterpretation arguments demonstrate a particular
frailty that any argument without a clear amendment to the Code
faces.
In re TS Industries, Inc.73 is the most recent attempt at reinter-
pretation and clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of arguments
made in favor of reinterpreting the Code to allow for enforcement
of prepetition lending agreements. Moreover, TS Industries
exemplifies the unexpected extremes to which some courts may be
willing to go to force a rereading of § 365. Instead of presenting a
situation in which the debtor is trying to assume a prepetition
agreement for DIP financing, TS Industries involves a debtor trying
to reject the agreement. Most simply, the court could have chosen
to read the statute literally, finding that the debtor could not
assume such a contract-the equivalent of allowing the debtor to
reject the agreement. Instead, as will be discussed, the court went
to great lengths to redefine § 365(c)(2) in order to allow a debtor
the option of assuming these contracts.
TS Industries involved a prepetition agreement among TS
Industries on the one hand, and its wholly-owned subsidiary Won-
Door, certain TS Industries shareholders, and several of its
creditors, on the other. The purpose of the agreement was "to
reinstate TS' obligations to its debentureholders, restructure a TS-
Credit Suisse line of credit, and provide for repayment of that line
of credit through certain stock transactions ... and financing by
Won-Door." 74 The agreement explicitly contemplated that these
steps would be taken in conjunction with TS' filing for bankrupt-
cy.7 5 After filing, however, TS determined that the deal was no
longer feasible (as did the other parties to the agreement) and
presented a reorganization plan which contemplated that assump-
tion of the original agreement would be prohibited by § 365(c)(2).
Other creditors, favoring the original prepetition agreement, argued
that § 365(c)(2) did not apply to this kind of transaction and
attempted to have the new reorganization plan rejected. 76 Inter-
72 See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
7 117 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
74 Id. at 684.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 684-85.
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estingly, all of the parties to the prepetition agreement argued for
a literal reading of § 365(c)(2), while third-party creditors argued for
the more narrow interpretation. 77 The court, agreeing with the
third-party creditors, redefined the scope of § 365(c)(2) to exclude
prepetition agreements in which both the debtor and creditor
expressly contemplated bankruptcy when entering into the agree-
ment.
78
The first argument of the court is that Congress could not have
intended to shield consenting creditors from the assumption of
prepetition agreements for postpetition financial accommodations.
To make the argument, the court compares §§ 365(c)(2) and
365(e)(2)(B) 79 and infers that because the latter section excepts
financial accommodation contracts from the general rule that voids
clauses restricting the debtor's right to assume or assign a contract
postpetition because of insolvency or financial condition,8 0 it is
inferable that Congress intended to protect financing creditors from
involuntary extensions of credit when bankruptcy created a "funda-
mental change in circumstances [that] warrant[ed] the parties
reassessing their deal through the tool of non-assumption under
§ 365(c)(2)."
8 1
The gravamen of this argument is that the purpose of the
§ 365(c)(2) exception is to avoid prepetition executory contracts for
financial accommodations in the event of a significant or fundamen-
tal change in circumstance. This is essentially an argument
borrowed from contract law principles of commercial impracticabili-
ty or frustration.8 2 Knowledge of the impending bankruptcy by
77 This position is particularly interesting in light of the earlier
discussion of the operation of § 365. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying
text. Even if the § 365(c)(2) hurdle is overcome, the DIP still has the option,
under the supervision of the court, of rejecting the contract. If TS
Industries had already indicated its desire not to enforce the contract, the
third-party creditors would have to demonstrate that rejection of the plan
was an abuse of the DIP's business judgment and offer a competing plan that
incorporated the original agreement. The court would then have to decide
which plan to approve. See TS Industries, 117 B.R. at 689; see also FED. R. BANKR.
P. 6006 (1988) ("When a motion is made [to assume, reject, or assign an
executory contract] the court shall set a hearing on notice to the other
party to the contract ....").
78 See TS Industries, 117 B.R. at 687.
79 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B)(1988).
so See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(A)(1988). These clauses are commonly referred
to as ipsofacto clauses.
81 TS Industries, 117 B.R. at 687.
82 For an instructive discussion of commercial impracticability and
frustration, see, e.g., American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine
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the parties would therefore negate the justification and presumably
bring the agreement outside of § 365(c)(2). That is, if the risk that
would frustrate the purpose of the contract is fully acknowledged by
the parties during negotiation, then it is hard to argue that such a
risk could frustrate the contract.
However, by essentially making a contract law argument, the
court confuses the respective roles of contract law and bankruptcy
law. If state contract law would void the contract in the event of
bankruptcy,85 a court could reason that the contract was not
assumable because it was void under state law at the time of filing
and, therefore, not property of the estate. Once the contract is
deemed to exist, however, (and the court must find that it does to
reach the § 365 issue) then bankruptcy law takes over, and it is
anomalous to apply state contract law principles in determining the
meaning or intent of the Bankruptcy Code.8
4
This distinction is important because, as discussed earlier, the
history of § 365 indicates that it is meant to provide an opportunity
for the assumption of value by the DIP.8 5 This opportunity comes
only at the risk of the other party to the contract, and § 365(c)(2)
seems to have been written to shield certain other parties, namely
creditors, from that risk. Therefore, the question is whether the
drafters of § 365(c)(2) intended to shield creditors from such risk
only to the extent that the creditors did not consent to the filing of
bankruptcy (the TS Industries position), or whether they intended to
shield the creditor absolutely, knowing that the prepetition
agreement could always be renegotiated postpetition. This issue is
highlighted in In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc.,8 6 in which the court
theorized that if the intent of Congress was only to protect those
Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 941-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissing a claim for additional costs
because war had broken out in the Suez Canal region and substantial costs
were incurred to make contracted shipment).
" It is assumed here that the court is arguing that the contract was void
because the onset of bankruptcy made it commercially impracticable.
Therefore, no contract existed to become property of the bankruptcy estate.
Certainly this is a somewhat strange argument, but it is tantamount to what
the TS Industries court attempts to rationalize.
84 See also Westbrook, supra note 61, at 285-87 & n.248 (explaining some of
the problems that may arise from bankruptcy law conflicting with state
contract law). Presumably, if every court applied state law contract
principals to interpret the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, a wide variety
of interpretations would exist.
85 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
86 116 B.R. 712 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), aff'd in relevant part, 945 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1991).
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creditors that did not contemplate bankruptcy as an integral part of
the financial agreement, Congress could have added a clause, as it
has in other sections of the Code, excluding from the scope of
§ 365(c)(2) those lenders who consent to assumption in the
prepetition agreement.
By way of comparison, § 365(c)(1) prohibits the assumption of
certain contracts ... only when the non-debtor party to the
contract does not consent to assumption. Subsection 365(c)(2) is
the very next subsection, and it prohibits the assumption of all
financial accommodation contracts with no reference to the
consent of the non-debtor party to the contract.
8 7
Considering the juxtaposition of §§ 365(c)(1) and 365(c)(2), the lack
of clarification in the latter section is unlikely to have been a "mere
oversight of the drafters."8 8 Moreover, this strict reading of the
statute is not confined to the Sun Runner case. Several earlier cases,
including In re Swift Aire Lines, Inc.8 9 and In re New Town Mall 90
also found that the clear intent of Congress was that "a debtor-in-
possession cannot assign or assume an executory contract for
financing."
91
Thus, arguments that certain risk shifting was not intended by the
drafters is suspect, particularly when the argument is based on
principles derived from contract law. Laudable as the result of
shifting risk back to the creditor in this context may be, if it is
reached through the application of contract rather than bankruptcy
principles, it is of questionable validity.
The court's second argument in TS Industries attacks the folly of
withholding permission to assume a prepetition agreement when the
creditor has clearly consented to the assumption, particularly in
light of the Chapter 11 goal of allowing the trustee to operate the
business after bankruptcy.9 2 Other courts have also held that
consent is an important factor in determining the existence of a
§ 365(c)(2) exception,93 and this Comment urges such a conclusion
87 id. at 717.
S id.
89 30 B.R. 490, 496 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).
90 17 B.R. 326, 327 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
91 Id.
92 See In re TS Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
93 See generally In re Charrington Worldwide Enters., Inc., 98 B.R. 65, 68
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), affd 110 B.R. 973 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that
"[t]he legislative history of [§ 36 5(c)(2)] leaves no doubt that this exception
to the assumability of executory contracts was drafted for the purpose of
assuring that contracts to lend money or to extend credit .,. should not
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as well: it is more realistic to allow prepetition negotiation for
financial accommodation executory contracts or DIP financings, and
more in line with the Code's preference towards efficient and
speedy bankruptcies. This argument, however, is problematic given
the current language of the Code.
While the current Code does seem to emphasize the importance
of certain prepetition activity in creating greater efficiency in the
postpetition bankruptcy proceedings,9 4 many of these provisions
require consideration of all the creditors and not merely individual
credit agreements.95 Therefore, the court's conclusion that there
is an emphasis on permitting the trustee to run the business after
bankruptcy, and hence, an emphasis on permitting prepetition
agreements that are intended to operate after bankruptcy9 6 is only
half right-the emphasis is conditioned on the perceived fairness of
the prepetition agreement to all creditors.9 7 Indeed, if Congress'
desire to permit the trustee to run the business postpetition was so
overwhelming, one must question why there is a § 365(c)(2)
exception at all that hinders the DIP's ability to assume an executory
contract. The question is one of degree, and simply stating that a
particular result is foolish is insufficient to create a basis for clear
and consistent future reinterpretation.
The court's final point is that the legislative history of the Code
in conjunction with its provisions for prepackaged plans evidences
a preference for workouts and private negotiations. 98 The court
posits that the reinterpreted reading of § 365(c)(2), allowing
assumption of prepetition agreements for financial accommoda-
be assumable without the consent of the other party to the contract"); In
re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977, 987 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)
(indicating that consent might be a condition by which an executory
contract to extend financial accommodations would fall outside the realm
of the § 365(c)(2) exception).
94 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(b)(1), 1121(a), 1126(b) (all contemplating
prepetition activity to facilitate post-filing expediency); see also supra notes 45-
47 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule
4001(c)(1) that necessitate prepetition negotiation with DIP financers).
95 This point is perhaps most obvious in the § 1102(b)(1) provision which
requires that prepetition creditors committees be "fairly chosen and ...
representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented."
9 See TS Industries, 117 B.R. at 687-88.
97 See also Sun Runner Marine, 116 B.R. at 718 ("[Section] 365 is designed to
protect not only the interests of the parties to the executory contract in
question, but also the interests of all of the creditors.") (citing In re Placid
Oil Co., 72 B.R. 135 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)).
98 See TS Industries, 117 B.R. at 688.
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tions, would necessarily encourage these desired workouts.
99
Although there is academic and legislative support for the court's
premise that bankruptcy is intended as a last resort when prepeti-
tion mutual agreement fails, 00 it is not clear that the court's
reinterpretation of § 365(c)(2) would stimulate such workouts any
more than the literal reading of the section.
To understand this point, it is important to realize that in
discussing workouts, the TS Industries court unwittingly lumps
together several types of creditors-some of whom might be more
willing to lend money if § 365(c)(2) were interpreted so as to
stimulate workouts more than a literal reading of the section. One
such distinct group of creditors is those who only want to lend
money in a prepetition workout. For these creditors, the operation
of § 365(c)(2), read literally, makes lending safer in that the
creditors do not bear any risk that they will have to lend money to
a bankrupt. Consequently, and in contradiction of the court's
inference that a reinterpretation of § 365(c)(2) will encourage more
workouts, these creditors will feel secure in making more loans
available to debtors.10 1 A second group of creditors includes
those who contemplate lending money both prepetition and post-
petition.10 2 For these creditors, the literal operation of § 365(c)-
(2) would also seem to make both the prepetition and postpetition
financing less risky for the reasons just stated, and because these
creditors know that they will have the chance to renegotiate the
postpetition financing after filing. Again, contrary to the court's
99 See id. at 688-89.
100 See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179-80 (explaining that most reorganizations occur out
of court and stating that "[w]hen an out-of-court arrangement is inade-
quate to rehabilitate a business, the bankruptcy laws provide an alterna-
tive"); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796 (describing reorganization under Chapter 11 as
"literally the last clear chance" for investor protection); Thomas H.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 867 (1982) (commenting that "[o]ne would normally expect to see
consensual deals among creditors outside of the bankruptcy process
attempted first ...
101 Of course these lenders could also use ipso facto clauses under § 365(e)
to protect themselves, see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text, but there
is a cost to the creditor of added protection-contracts without ipso facto
language are more desirable to debtors than are contracts with the
language, and fees and rates should reflect that cost.
102 See, e.g., Sun Runner Marine, 116 B.R. at 714-15 (debtor entered bankruptcy
with an unexpired contract governing financial arrangements that was
assumed postpetition as an executory contract).
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inference, the literal reading of § 365(c)(2), and not the reinterpre-
tation, would seem to stimulate workouts.
103
A final group of creditors comprises those DIP lenders who
negotiate and contract prepetition. Certainly for these lenders, the
literal reading of § 365(c)(2) would seem absurd in that an informed
prepetition agreement to finance the debtor after bankruptcy
cannot be assumed, 1 4 but as discussed earlier, it is not clear
whether the Code actually intends that contracts for DIP financing
be negotiated and finalized prepetition. Section 364 implies that
negotiation should occur only after court approval, whereas Rule
4001(c)(1) implies that negotiation is necessary prepetition, and §
365(c)(2), read literally, denies assumption of such contracts. Thus,
in the case of DIP financing, the court's third argument may also be
invalid-a reading of the Code would imply that § 364 DIP financing
contracts should not occur prepetition regardless of other provi-
sions favoring prepetition planning.
In sum, the plain language of the Code directly conflicts with
the analysis presented in TS Industries, making it difficult to accept
the conclusions of the court. Nevertheless, the TS Industries court's
attempted reinterpretation of § 365(c)(2) should be viewed as an
admirable reaction in an environment in which a literal reading of
the Code makes no sense from either the perspective of bankruptcy
law or contract law. A rewriting or amendment of § 365(c)(2), and
not judicial reinterpretation, is the only way explicitly to define the
risks and permit the growth of DIP financing when appropriate.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE REWRITING OF § 365(c)(2)
Bankruptcy law encompasses several, often competing objectives
that interface with external law. Within chapter 11 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code, these competing interests tend to revolve around the
desire to rehabilitate the debtor because, in an economic sense, the
tangible and intangible benefits of an "ongoing operation" tend to
create value.1" 5 There is value both to the creditors from the
continued operation of the business rather than from its liquidation,
as well as external value to the community which benefits from the
"'Supporting the TS Industries court's inference is the notion that
allowing such agreements to be assumable would provide added leverage to
debtors in prepetition against other third-party creditors.
104 See supra text at 25-26.
105 A desire to preserve the going concern value of business enterprises
infuses much of the analysis in H.R. Rep. No. 595. See supra note 64.
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business' products. The other, sometimes competing, policy is to
maximize recovery to the original creditors by fairly distributing
assets under a structure that treats similarly situated creditors
equally.
10 6
It is in the pre-bankruptcy context that these internal policies of
bankruptcy law most obviously interact with external law, and, most
important to this Comment, to contract law in particular. As stated
by Raymond Nimmer:
The objective [in pre-bankruptcy] is to structure bankruptcy rules
so as to facilitate financial transactions by a debtor struggling to
survive without filing bankruptcy. Typically, the rules protect a
third party who has dealt with such a debtor, thereby reducing the
perceived risk to that party and increasing the probability that the
transaction will occur under relatively normal terms.
10 7
For prepetition lenders for whom lending is not contingent on the
filing of bankruptcy, § 365(c)(2)'s protection from the risk of
bankruptcy filing would seem to serve these perceived policy goals
of the Bankruptcy Code.108 The benefit of this section is not
apparent, however, in the context of prepetition agreements for
§ 364 DIP financing in which lenders have contemplated bankrupt-
cy. There are really two reasons for this problematic interaction of
§ 365(c)(2) and DIP financing under § 364. The first is based on
Nimmer's argument'0 9 that the Code should facilitate rehabilita-
tion of the debtor without filing for bankruptcy. By disallowing
prepetition agreements for postpetition DIP financing,110 the
Code fails to recognize the creation of two important sources of
value for the debtor: first, the debtor's ability to secure DIP
financing in prepetition enables her to weigh carefully the relative
merits of out-of-bankruptcy workout with bankruptcy reorganiza-
106 See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, part 1, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1973) (discussing the various
goals of the bankruptcy system).
107 Nimmer, supra note 60, at 510.
108 Because these creditors are shielded from bankruptcy, they are free to
contract with the debtor with much less risk to the contract (that is, no
risk of having further to extend financing after bankruptcy has been filed).
This limitation on the lender's risk allows more normal contracting and
arguably a better chance for debtors to secure financing that could lead
to recovery outside the context of bankruptcy.
109 See supra text accompanying note 107.
110 Arguably, because prepetition agreements are unenforceable postpet-
tion, they are effectively disallowed, at least to the extent that the debtor
cannot clearly rely on such agreements.
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tion, and second, DIP financing agreements can create an added
weapon in prepetition to encourage lenders to settle outside of
bankruptcy.
111
The financial needs of the debtor are also poorly served by the
present statutory framework. As previously discussed, depending
on the working capital requirements of the debtor, DIP financing
may be needed on or about the day that filing occurs. 112 Such
financing can be assured only if the debtor has had a chance fully
to negotiate DIP financing prepetition under a framework in which
it can rely on those agreements. Section 365(c)(2), however, does
not statutorily recognize this need of the debtor. Consequently, the
risk that the debtor will have to file for bankruptcy is increased
because the debtor will be unable to purchase inventory and run the
business until more protracted postpetition negotiations for DIP
financing are successfully completed.
Regardless of the force of these arguments, debtors and lenders,
pressured by market forces,113 have essentially disregarded § 365-
(c)(2) and acted as if prepetition agreements are enforceable after
bankruptcy. 114  In order for the Code to conform to common
practice and to recognize that DIP financing should be assumable
under its provisions, only a very simple amendment to § 365(c)(2)
is necessary.
The most straightforward method of amendment might simply
be to qualify § 365(c)(2) by adding an exception for contracts in
which the creditor consents prepetition to assumability by the DIP
II Not everyone will agree that giving the debtor extra leverage vis-a-vis
its creditors is a good idea. See, e.g., Donlan, supra note 42, at 10 ("Talk of
broken legs or debtors' prison makes you nervous? Under today's Bankruptcy
Code, debtor-in-possession financing, or DIP lending, is just as extreme, in the
opposite direction."). However, if one purpose of the Code is to stimulate
settlements outside of bankruptcy, and at the same time, the Code clearly
contemplates DIP financing, it seems hard to argue that the debtor should
not be able to negotiate DIP financing terms prepetition so that it can
demonstrate to creditors the very real possibility of a new superpriority
financing in postpetition. The practical effect should be greater ability for
the debtor to renegotiate debt agreements without filing.
11 See e.g., Bankruptcy Judge Clears $600 Million Financingfor Macy, WALL ST.J.,
Feb. 14, 1992, at A2 (stating that Macy received interim DIP financing of $60
million just two days after filing for bankruptcy while waiting for court
approval for its $600 million DIP financing line).
113 See supra note 31.
114 Indeed, as previously discussed, the market may demand that they be
assumable at the option of the DIP and the bankruptcy court. See supra note
31.
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after bankruptcy. This clause would mirror the clause in § 365(c)(1)
that states that the DIP may not assume or assign an executory
contract if "applicable law excuses a party, other than the debt-
or"1 1 5 and "such party does not consent to such assumption or
assignment," but would be included to operate prepetition.
116
Thus, unlike the exception in § 365(c)(1) which allows a creditor to
consent postpetition after being excused by applicable law, the new
amendment would override § 365(c)(2) if the creditor consented
prepetition. (Consent postpetition is not necessary as that is
congruent with renegotiation under the current § 365(c)(2)). This
new language therefore would deny exclusion under § 365(c)(2) if
the creditor consented to such assumption.1
7
Such a change would satisfy the policies of bankruptcy law as
well as the external policies of contract law because third-party
creditors would still be protected by the requirements in § 365(a) of
court approval." 8 The creditor in privity would be well aware of
any risk that it was incurring, and the DIP would then be in a
position to choose whether the executory contract was in its best
interests after filing for bankruptcy. Moreover, such a clause would
permit a debtor to weigh the relative benefits of rehabilitation
either through or outside of bankruptcy. Finally, the amendment
would create added leverage for debtors to apply in their pre-
petition negotiation with creditors, thereby promoting the desired
arms-length renegotiation and solutions outside of bankruptcy.
Acceptance of this proposed amendment to § 365(c)(2) would
also necessitate a reexamination of § 365(e).' 19 Section 365(e)
generally prohibits the use of ipsofacto clauses:
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract ... an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be
terminated or modified ... solely because of a provision in such
contract or lease that is conditioned on ... the insolvency or
115 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A).
116 Id. § 365(c)(1)(B).
117 Moreover, because of the peculiarities of DIP financings, it would seem
absurd to permit assumption and assignment by the DIP, and the Code should
clearly indicate that, notwithstanding other provisions under the Chapter,
assumption does not permit assignment by the DIP unless the creditor also
explicitly consented to such assignment.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)(1988) (stating that the DIP "subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor").
19 11 U.S.C. § 365(e).
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financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of
the case.
120
There is an exception, however, to the general rule against ipso
facto clauses found in § 365(e)(2)(B) that upholds the validity of ipso
facto clauses in financial accommodation contracts.1 21 In conjunc-
tion with the current literal reading of § 365(c)(2), which denies
assumption of executory financial accommodation contracts anyway,
§ 365(e)(2)(B) is, at best, added protection to cautious creditors and
at worst, superfluous. Under the proposed change of § 365(c)(2),
however, § 365(e)(2)(B) would get new life, as cautious creditors
could protect themselves from court perceived consent through the
inclusion of an ipso facto clause. That is, DIP financiers with
sufficient market power could protect themselves from assumption
simply by including an ipso facto clause in their caveats. This
scenario would frustrate the purpose of the § 365(c)(2) amendment
by leading to a preposterous conflict in DIP financing agreements:
one covenant would require the filing of bankruptcy by the debtor
as one of many preconditions to the extension of credit,122 while
another covenant would void the contract upon the debtor's filing
for bankruptcy. It is unclear whether a court presented with such
facts would simply ignore the two clauses, or would hold that the
ipsofacto clause overrides the clear consent implied in the covenant
requiring the filing of bankruptcy. By amending § 365(e)(2)(B) to
mirror the consent language in § 365(e)(2)(A), 123 the Code will
clearly indicate that § 364 DIP financing that is agreed to prepeti-
tion is assumable by the DIP.
124
120 Id. §§ 365(e)(1)(A).
121 See id. § 365(e)(2)(B) (stating that the rule against ipso facto clauses does
not apply if "such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other
debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor").
122 Other caveats might include the requirement that the court affirm
the DIP financing plan.
123 In light of the way that § 365(e)(2)(A) and (B) match the provisions of
§ 365(c)(1) and (2), it is clear that an amendment to § 365(c)(2) also requires
an amendment to § 365(e)(2)(B). Section 365(e)(2)(A) states that ipso facto
clauses will not be refused if applicable law excuses the other party to the
contract and "such party does not consent to such assumption." 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e)(2)(A)(ii). Arguably, the same requirement should be included in
§ 365(e)(2)(B).
124 The discussion regarding amendment of § 365(c)(2) provides an
interesting basis for the examination of the expanded use of DIP financing
agreements prepetition. The recent trend of prepackaged bankruptcies is
perhaps the most obvious area for prepetition innovation. Whereas it may
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IV. CONCLUSION
While some readers may consider some of the arguments made
in this Comment radical, the overarching proposal for an amend-
ment to the Bankruptcy Code is a simple and practical response to
the needs and practices of the current DIP financing market. The
great divergence of bankruptcy courts' interpretations of§ 365(c)(2)
indicates that a literal § 365(c)(2) may be obsolete in the current
business bankruptcy environment, at least to the extent of its
interaction with § 364 DIP financing that is agreed to prepetition.
Unless § 365(c)(2) is amended, debtors and creditors alike will be
subject to arbitrary and unpredictable ad hoc court interpretations
of how § 365(c)(2) should be applied. For companies that are
struggling to decide what form of reorganization will maximize
value for all stakeholders, whether they be creditors or shareholders,
the amendment of § 365(c)(2) to include consent language like that
already be common practice in the current market to include DIP financing
agreements in creditor negotiations of prepackaged plans, Lang Interview,
supra note 20, there is no specific rule that permits prepetition confirmation
by creditors of § 364 financing. In fact, under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c)(2),
see FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(2), while interim financing may be received earlier
by the debtor, the bankruptcy court is not even authorized to commence
hearings for fixed DIP financing until at least 15 days after the motion for
financing has been served. See id.
In practice, prepackaged negotiations often include DIP financing as part
of the proposed reorganization, Lang Interview, supra note 20, and creditor
acceptance acts as de facto acceptance of the financing before filing so that
hearings will be as swift as possible postpetition. This practice promotes
efficiency and seems to have statutory basis to the extent that DIP financing
is an important part of a prepackaged plan and to the extent that §§ 1126
and 1129 authorize these prepetition agreements for plans of reorganization.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(a) (authorizing holders of claims to accept or reject
reorganization plans), 1129(a) (providing for court confirmation of such
plans).
Moreover, there has been an increasing emphasis placed on the value of
these prepetition agreements with creditors as is evident in the new
movement for instant bankruptcies. See generally Case & Harwood, supra note
13 (discussing the use of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to speed the
bankruptcy confirmation process). It therefore seems only practical that
DIP financings with the same notice and confirmation requirements as
prepackaged plans that can be agreed upon by creditors prepetition ought
to be assumable by the DIP without the costly and lengthy hearing process
that is contemplated under the current Code.
Clearly, this proposal is simply intended as a brief sketch of the new
direction that the Bankruptcy Code could take if § 365 is amended. Whereas
this proposal presents complicated problems that cannot be addressed here,
the benefits it would provide in terms of reduced costs and time would seem
to merit serious consideration.
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found in § 365(c)(1) (along with the concurrent amendment of
§ 365(e)(2)(B)) would provide clear guidance that reliance on
prepetition agreements for DIP financing is a predictable means for
weighing some of the value of filing for Chapter 11 protection.
This Comment has repeatedly argued that the innovations
offered herein are actually not innovations at all. Indeed, the
market for DIP financing practically performs all of the suggested
amendments without the benefit of the express statutory blessings
of the Code. However, the mere fact that the market forces that
currently exist allow the market to act effectively in spite of the
Code should offer little consolation. Given the incredible financial
changes that have taken place over the last decade, it is not clear
that these market conditions will persist. The only way to explicitly
recognize the valuable practices developed in the market and to
provide assurance to debtors is to make the law conform to these
practices through clear amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.

